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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that personal injury and property loss caused by a 
defective product can be recovered from a remote manufacturer without 
establishing privity.1  Conversely, a hot topic in warranty law today is whether 
economic loss can be recovered from a remote manufacturer in the chain of 
 
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank Mr. Jerome Mohsen for 
his excellent research, insights, and valuable contributions in the making of this Article.   
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
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distribution.2  The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) mandates that every 
manufacturer gives the implied warranty of merchantability for every sale of 
its product, unless the manufacturer disclaims it.3  The implied warranty of 
merchantability means that every product must be fit for its ordinary use.4  The 
implied warranty is the minimum standard set for each product sold by a 
manufacturer.5  Its importance cannot be overstated.  Currently, there is a 
significant split of authority among the states on whether a buyer must be in 
privity with the manufacturer of the product before that buyer can sue the 
manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.6 
This Article identifies each state’s position on whether that state requires 
privity before an aggrieved buyer can sue the remote manufacturer for breach 
of the implied warranty of merchantability.  In addition, this Article identifies 
the primary arguments put forth on both sides of the issue.  Currently, 
Wisconsin is in the distinct minority of states that do not permit the buyer to 
sue the remote manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability unless the buyer can establish privity.  Finally, the Article 
concludes with the Author’s analysis of the conflicting arguments and a 
recommendation for the future. 
II. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY—STATUTORY 
WARRANTY 
The implied warranty of merchantability is given by every seller who is a 
merchant with respect to the goods it sells.7  A manufacturer obviously qualifies 
as a merchant, and therefore gives the implied warranty of merchantability 
every time it sells a good.  The implied warranty of merchantability is 
understood to mean that the good being sold is fit for the ordinary purpose for 
which such good is normally used.8  Stated differently, the implied warranty of 
merchantability requires that a manufacturer’s good will actually fulfill its 
understood purpose.  In other words, shoe polish should actually polish your 
shoes, and if it doesn’t, the implied warranty of merchantability has been 
breached.  The importance of the implied warranty of merchantability is 
 
2. 1 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 10:20 
(2010). 
3. Id. § 5:1. 
4. Id. § 5:3. 
5. See id. § 5:1. 
6. Id. § 10:20. 
7. WIS. STAT. § 402.314(1) (2015–2016). 
8. Id. § 402.314(2)(c). 
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underscored by the fact that it is required by law in every merchant transaction.9  
It is a mandated, statutory warranty as opposed to an express warranty which 
the seller has the option to offer.10 
A. Duration of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
There is no fixed duration for the implied warranty of merchantability.11  
The merchantability warranty does not extend to future performance of a good 
like an express warranty.12  Rather, the warranty is measured as of the time of 
delivery.13  An action, therefore, brought for breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability must be brought before the UCC statute of limitations expires14 
or at an earlier agreed expiration date as provided in the parties’ contract.15  If 
the parties do agree to a shorter statute of limitation, the minimum period cannot 
be less than one year.16   
B. Disclaiming the Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Limitations of 
Remedy 
Risk allocation is dealt with in entirely different ways depending upon 
whether an action is denominated as one in tort or contract.  Tort law places the 
risk of loss onto the manufacturer to protect the public from personal injury and 
property damage.17  On the other hand, contract law, through the UCC, provides 
the structure for the parties to allocate any risk of economic loss18 between or 
amongst themselves through their contract.19  Interestingly, in Wisconsin, the 
tort and contract claims are mutually exclusive and cannot be brought in the 
same lawsuit.20  Therefore, it’s critical for an attorney to be able to properly 
classify the type of loss suffered by the client in order to properly plead a case. 
 
9. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 2, § 5:1. 
10. Id. § 4:1. 
11. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-6529, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172348, at *87 (S.D. W. 
Va. Nov. 24, 2015) (quoting Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. WIS. STAT. § 402.725(1) (2015–2016). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, ¶ 18, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 699 N.W.2d 167 (quoting 
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 39, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462). 
18. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from Non-
Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2008). 
19. Grams, 2005 WI 112, ¶ 17 (citing Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 
395, 407, 573 N.W.2d 842, 847–48 (1998)).  
20. Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 644, 273 N.W.2d 233, 240 (1979). 
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One way that manufacturers allocate the risk of loss in a sales transaction 
is through the use of disclaimers.  Manufacturers are permitted to expressly 
modify or completely exclude the implied warranty of merchantability.21  To 
expressly exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability the 
manufacturer’s disclaimer must mention the word “merchantability” and, if the 
disclaimer is in writing, it must be conspicuous.22  The implied warranty of 
merchantability can also be excluded by expressions such as “as is” or by the 
buyer’s inspection of the goods prior to their purchase.23  Finally, the implied 
warranty of merchantability can be modified or excluded by course of dealing, 
course of performance, or trade practice.24   
Another way for manufacturers to control risk of loss is by limiting the 
buyer’s remedies in the event of a loss.  The manufacturer may limit the buyer’s 
remedy to an exclusive one25 (e.g., repair or replacement) provided that remedy 
does not fail for its essential purpose.26  Finally, the manufacturer may also 
exclude consequential damages, unless the exclusion is deemed 
unconscionable.27   
All of the foregoing methods are available to a manufacturer to control its 
exposure to economic loss.  It’s clear, however, that if a disclaimer or limitation 
of remedy is not disclosed to the buyer at the time that the buyer contracts to 
buy the product, the disclaimer or limitation of remedy is not effective.28  As a 
general rule, it is the burden of the party seeking to invoke a warranty exclusion 
or limitation of remedy to plead and prove its effect.29  Also, warranty 
exclusions and limitation of remedy clauses are strictly construed against the 
author.30   
The following case is instructive on the correct way for a manufacturer to 
effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability and also limit the 
buyer’s remedy.  In R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., the buyer purchased 
 
21. WIS. STAT. § 402.316(2). 
22. Id. 
23. Id. §§ 402.316(3)(a)–(b). 
24. Id. § 402.316(3)(d). 
25. Id. §§ 402.719(1)(a)–(b). 
26. Id. § 402.719(2). 
27. Id. § 402.719(3). 
28. See Spagnol Enters., Inc. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see 
also Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 850, 852–53 (Okla. 1979). 
29. DeCoria v. Red’s Trailer Mart, Inc., 491 P.2d 241, 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
30. Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 216 N.E.2d 282, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1965) (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77–78 (N.J. 1960)). 
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a grain storage bin from the manufacturer’s dealer.31  The terms of sale 
contained a manufacturer’s express warranty that the product was free from 
defects in material and workmanship.32  Included within the language of the 
express warranty, was a disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
merchantability.33  Also in the express warranty, the manufacturer limited its 
liability to repair and replacement for a period of twelve months after the date 
of delivery.34  Upon the product’s failure to perform as expected, the buyer sued 
the manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.35  The 
buyer sought to nullify the effect of the implied warranty disclaimer and the 
limitation of remedy on the basis that neither the buyer nor the dealer were ever 
actually aware of the warranty exclusion or limitation of remedy.36  The court 
concluded, however, that actual knowledge was not required but simply that 
the disclaimer and limitation of remedy be “reasonably noticeable.”37  In fact, 
the court found that the disclaimer and limitation of remedy were conspicuous 
as required by the UCC.38   
The simple solution to disclosing the implied warranty of merchantability 
disclaimer or limitation of remedy is to follow the lead of the R & L Grain Co. 
case and place the merchantability disclaimer or limitation of remedy in with 
the express warranty,39 and require that the merchantability disclaimer or 
limitation of remedy be included in the selling dealer’s forms or otherwise 
included as part of the sales transaction.40  The essential legal requirement that 
must be satisfied is that the disclaimer or limitation of remedy be conspicuous 
in the sales contract.   
III. HORIZONTAL PRIVITY OR VERTICAL PRIVITY 
Privity is defined as “[t]he connection or relationship between two parties, 
each having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter.”41  Privity 
“implies a connection, mutuality of will, and interaction of parties.”42  There 
 
31. 531 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
32. Id. at 207. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 204. 
36. Id. at 208. 
37. Id. at 209. 
38. Id. 
39. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty’s, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). 
40. Hunter v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 303 (8th Cir. 1986). 
41. Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
42. Wrenshall State Bank v. Shutt, 202 Wis. 281, 232 N.W. 530, 530 (1930). 
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are two types of privity.43  One is known as horizontal privity and the other is 
vertical privity.44  The distinction between horizontal and vertical privity is 
significant.  Horizontal privity is defined as “[t]he legal relationship between a 
party and a nonparty who is related to the party (such as a buyer and a member 
of the buyer’s family).”45  Horizontal privity issues address the question of 
“whether persons other than the buyer of defective goods can recover from the 
buyer’s immediate seller on a warranty theory.”46  Vertical privity is defined as 
“[t]he legal relationship between parties in a product’s chain of distribution 
(such as a manufacturer[, wholesaler, retailer, buyer] and a seller).”47  Vertical 
privity issues ask “whether parties in the distributive chain prior to the 
immediate seller can be held liable to the ultimate purchaser for loss caused by 
the defective product.”48  Official comment 3 to section 2-318 (Third Party 
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied) makes clear that the intent of 
the section was to deal with horizontal privity and not vertical privity.49  In fact, 
the official comment makes clear that the section was “not intended to enlarge 
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to 
[the] buyer who resells, extend to [any] other persons in the distributive 
chain.”50  Therefore, the UCC has left vertical privity issues to be decided by 
each state independently. 
A. The Erosion of the Vertical Privity Requirement 
The requirement that one be in privity with the other party in the distributive 
chain before one is able to sue that party has been under attack for many years.51  
The courts have developed a number of approaches to avoid the requirement of 
vertical privity when a buyer of a product wishes to assert a claim against a 
remote manufacturer in the distributive chain.  There are at least four fairly 
identifiable approaches.   
 
43. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 287 (Alaska 1976). 
44. See id. 
45. Horizontal Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
46. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 287. 
47. Vertical Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
48. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 287. 
49. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). 
50. Id. 
51. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE 
L.J. 1099, 1099, 1148 (1960) (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931)). 
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1. Agency/Conduit Concepts   
Some courts have used the idea that those selling the manufacturer’s 
product are simply agents or conduits of the manufacturer. 52  For example, in 
Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the buyer purchased Ford trucks from the Ford 
dealer and not directly from Ford.53  Nevertheless, the buyer sued Ford for 
defects in the trucks, and Ford raised the vertical privity defense.54  The court 
rejected the vertical privity defense because the contractual arrangement 
between the manufacturer and the dealer created an agency relationship, 
particularly where it is shown that the manufacturer significantly participated 
in the sale through personal contact with the buyer and by means of 
advertising.55 
2. Third-Party Beneficiary   
“The absence of privity will not bar an action upon an implied warranty [of 
merchantability] . . . when the circumstances attendant the sales transaction 
make the remote purchaser a third-party beneficiary of the contract.”56  In R & 
L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., R & L Grain Co. purchased a grain storage 
bin from a dealer of the defendant manufacturer.57  When the bin proved to be 
unsatisfactory for Wisconsin winters, the plaintiff sued alleging various 
theories, including breach of implied warranty of merchantability.58  The 
manufacturer responded by filing a motion to dismiss the implied warranty 
claim on the basis that there was no privity between the parties.59  The court 
noted that although privity is generally a necessary element to maintain a claim 
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the absence of privity is 
not a bar when the contract circumstances indicate that the remote purchaser 
was a third-party beneficiary of the primary contract.60  Some courts require 
that in order for a buyer to qualify as a third-party beneficiary, the manufacturer 
 
52. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho 1984); see also Morrow v. Caloric 
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 53 (Mo. 1963). 
53. 579 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff’d, 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985). 
54. See id. 
55. Id. 
56. R & L Grain Co. v. Chi. E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing Frank’s 
Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). 
57. Id. at 203. 
58. Id. at 204. 
59. Id. at 204, 207–08. 
60. Id. at 208; see also Naef v. Masonite Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D. Ala. 1996) 
(quoting Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)). 
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must know the identity, requirements, and purpose of the dealer’s customer.61  
“[M]erely alleging that the remote [manufacturer] knows that a dealer will 
resell the . . . product” is not sufficient to support the third-party beneficiary 
claim.62 
3. Strict Liability 
A remote manufacturer “who sells or distributes a defective product is 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”63  This 
principle is commonly known as strict liability.64  “Strict liability . . . for 
defectively manufactured products merges the concept of implied warranty, in 
which negligence is not required, with the tort concept of negligence, in which 
contractual privity is not required.”65  No privity is required in a strict liability 
claim against a manufacturer.66   
4. Express Warranty 
The fact that a product is sold with an express warranty from the 
manufacturer creates privity between the remote manufacturer and the ultimate 
buyer, notwithstanding that there is no contract between the two parties.67  In 
Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., the plaintiff purchased the manufacturer’s 
product from the manufacturer’s dealer.68  Prior to the purchase, the 
manufacturer provided express warranties to the remote purchaser regarding 
the product’s capabilities.69  Upon the product’s failure to live up to its 
warranted capabilities, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer for breach of the 
manufacturer’s express warranties.70  At the trial level, the plaintiff’s action 
against the manufacturer was dismissed because there was no privity between 
the plaintiff-buyer and the remote manufacturer.71  On appeal, however, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that there was privity between the remote 
manufacturer and the purchaser because of the manufacturer’s actions and 
 
61. Chi. Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 214, 219 (N.D. Ill. 1983) 
(citing Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). 
62. Id. (citing Slate Printing Co. v. Metro Envelope Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). 
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
64. See id. § 1 cmt. a. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 527, 319 N.W.2d 855, 863 (1982). 
68. Id. at 513–14. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 515. 
71. Id. at 516. 
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express representations made during the sales process.72  In essence, the court 
recognized that the manufacturer’s statements had become part of the basis of 
the bargain and thereby an express warranty.73  The grant of the express 
warranty creates a “contractual relationship” and, thereby legal privity, despite 
the fact that there is no contract between the buyer and the remote 
manufacturer.74 
B. Vertical Privity in the United States 
There is a significant split of authority among the states on whether a 
remote buyer must be in privity with a manufacturer before the buyer is 
permitted to sue for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  The 
majority of states do not require vertical privity and permit the remote buyer to 
sue the manufacturer directly for breach of the implied warranty of 
 
72. Id. at 518–19. 
73. Id. at 516, 527. 
74. McNeal v. Blue Bird Corp., No. 308763, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 1082, at *12 (June 12, 
2014) (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty’s, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)). 
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merchantability.75  A minority of states, however, do insist on privity between 
the remote manufacturer and the aggrieved buyer.76 
 
75. Thirty-one states do not require privity: (1) Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 
279, 289 (Alaska 1976); (2) Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 437 S.W.2d 459, 
462 (Ark. 1969); (3) Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216, 221 (Colo. 1982); (4) Martin 
v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 583 (Del. 1976); (5) Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 
659 P.2d 734, 743 (Haw. 1983) (applying the principle in a personal injury claim but seen as extending 
to economic loss in a federal case); (6) Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 958–
59 (Ind. 2005); (7) Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 
381 (La. 1972) (citing Marine Ins. Co. v. Strecker, 100 So. 2d 493, 494 (La. 1957); Le Blanc v. La. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. 1952)); (8) Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 
A.2d 478, 482 (Me. 1983) (stating rule generally, though in a personal injury case); (9) Jacobs v. 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. 1995); (10) Spence v. Three Rivers 
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1958); (11) Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. 
v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. 1997); (12) Hargett v. Midas Int’l Corp., 508 So. 2d 663, 
665 (Miss. 1987); (13) Groppel Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); 
(14) Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 919–20 (Mont. 1977); (15) Peterson v. N. Am. Plant 
Breeders, 354 N.W.2d 625, 632 (Neb. 1984); (16) Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co. of Pasadena, Cal., 
560 P.2d 154, 157 (Nev. 1977); (17) Dalton v. Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 629 A.2d 794, 797 (N.H. 
1993); (18) Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985); (19) 
Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 1983-NMCA-032, ¶ 59, 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646, 655 (stating rule 
generally, though in a personal injury case); (20) Lang v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805, 810 
(N.D. 1965); (21) Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 851–52 
(Okla. 1979); (22) Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 853–54 (Pa. 1968), overruled on other grounds 
by AM/PM Franchise Ass’n v. Atl. Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990); (23) Kelly v. Ford Motor 
Co., 290 A.2d 607, 610 (R.I. 1972); (24) Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 243 S.E.2d 831, 832 (S.C. 
1978); (25) Cundy v. Int’l Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W.2d 233, 240 (S.D. 1984); (26) Commercial 
Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Tenn. 1979); (27) Nobility Homes 
of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977); (28) Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. 
Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 17–18 (Utah 1990); (29) Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 
S.E.2d 384, 390 (Va. 1984); (30) Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82, 84 (W. Va. 1975) (stating 
rule generally in a personal injury case, overruling all previous cases requiring privity); (31) W. Equip. 
Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980). 
76. Nineteen states require privity for a remote buyer to sue a manufacturer for economic loss.  
(1) State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. J.B. Plastics, Inc., 505 So. 2d 1223, 1227 (Ala. 1987); (2) Flory v. 
Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 388 (Ariz. 1981); (3) Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 268 P.2d 
1041, 1048–49 (Cal. 1954); (4) Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 276 A.2d 807, 812 (Conn. Cir. 
Ct. 1970); (5) Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 450, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); (6) 
Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 208 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); (7) Salmon Rivers 
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306, 312 (Idaho 1975); (8) Mellander v. 
Kileen, 407 N.E.2d 1137, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); (9) Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 
103, 108 (Iowa 1995); (10) Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898–99 
(Kan. 1984); (11) Compex Int’l Co. v. Taylor, 209 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Ky. 2006), as modified on denial 
of reh’g (Jan. 25, 2007); (12) see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 637–38 (Md. 
1995) (requiring privity in the vertical chain and providing it by statute, see MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW § 2-314(1)(a) (West 2017) (“In §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this title, ‘seller’ includes the 
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler, or other middleman or the retailer . . . .”)); (13) Martin 
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C. Vertical Privity in Wisconsin 
The law of Wisconsin has historically required privity of contract in an 
action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.77  The rule came 
from English common law.78  The rationale for creation of the rule was to 
protect nascent manufacturers from the onslaught of potentially disastrous 
claims.79  Fifty years ago, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated 
that the tender days of the Industrial Revolution had long past and the Court 
should be more concerned about the injured and hapless buyer of manufactured 
products.80  The Court reasoned that the concepts of laissez-faire and caveat 
emptor should “give[] way to more humane considerations.”81  As a result, the 
Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability against a remote manufacturer for 
damage caused to an individual’s person or their property.82  Privity is no longer 
required in such an action.83  The reasons offered for no longer requiring privity 
are that the manufacturer is in the best position to distribute the costs created 
by the defective product onto all buyers via increased prices; the manufacturer 
may protect itself by purchasing insurance or a form of self-insurance; the 
manufacturer in the first instance creates the risk by placing the defective 
product on the market; and the manufacturer has the greatest ability to avoid 
the risk created by its product through its quality control measures.84 
Albeit privity is no longer required for personal injury or property damage, 
Wisconsin is in the minority of states that requires privity to assert a claim 
 
v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 374 N.E.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. 1978); (14) Gregory v. Atrium Door & Window 
Co., 415 S.E.2d 574, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); (15) Curl v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 114 Ohio St. 
3d 266, 2007-Ohio-3609, 871 N.E.2d 1141, at ¶ 26; (16) see State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. 
Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217–18 (Or. 1968); (17) Tex Enters., Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 66 P.3d 
625, 628 (Wash. 2003); (18) City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 
38, 41, 240 N.W.2d 124, 125 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. 
Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998); (19) Mainline Tractor & Equip. Co. 
v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1107 (D. Vt. 1996), aff’d, 79 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 444, 453 n.11 (D. Vt. 1993) (requiring privity 
according to a federal court’s interpretation of the Vermont Supreme Court’s dictum in Gochey v. 
Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921 (1990)). 
77. Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 831 (1962); Kennedy-
Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d 100, 109, 92 N.W.2d 247, 252 (1958); Prinsen v. Russos, 194 
Wis. 142, 146, 215 N.W. 905, 906 (1927). 




82. Id. at 459. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 450–51. 
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against a remote manufacturer for economic loss caused by breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability.85  For many years, however, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has been contemplating whether to change its 
position.86  The primary reason that caused courts to originally insist on privity 
as a prerequisite to an action for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability no longer exists.87  The Uniform Sales Act was the controlling 
law in Wisconsin at the time of the adoption of the rule, and the Sales Act 
provided that implied warranties extended only between immediate parties to 
the sale.88  Today, however, the Uniform Sales Act has been replaced by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which is decidedly neutral on whether vertical 
privity is required between the manufacturer and remote buyer regarding the 
implied warranty of merchantability.89  Therefore, the opportunity currently 
presents itself for Wisconsin to join the majority of states which have been 
persuaded to no longer require privity to maintain an action for breach of the 
implied warranty of merchantability against a remote manufacturer. 
D. Arguments in Favor of Retaining the Vertical Privity Requirement 
The reasons why a minority of states continue to require vertical privity 
before the buyer can sue the remote manufacturer for breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability can be fairly catalogued.   
The decision to bar vertical privity should be made by the legislature, not 
the courts.  Lifting the vertical privity requirement is a matter of public policy, 
and policy decisions should be made by the legislature.90  In light of the fact 
that the legislature has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, courts should 
 
85. Id. at 463. 
86. Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 831 (citing Smith v. 
Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704 (1959)) (“When this court declared by footnote in 
Smith v. Atco Co., that Wisconsin requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty cases, it was merely 
stating the then present status of our law.  This does not mean that this court will adhere to this rule 
forever, regardless of the persuasiveness of the arguments made, or authorities cited, in favor of 
changing it.  However, we do not deem the instant case a proper one in which to give consideration to 
this question.” (internal citation omitted)). 
87. Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 454 (“Dean Prosser’s reference to the Uniform Sales Act elucidates 
the most distressing problem with adopting the ‘implied warranty’ fiction in the present case.  The 
Uniform Sales Act as enacted by Wisconsin is the controlling law.  Sec. 15 of the Act [WIS. STAT. 
§ 121.15 (1961)], specifically provides that there are no implied warranties of quality other than those 
set forth in the Act.  These are the implied warranties between the ‘buyer’ and the ‘seller.’  By sec. 76 
of the Act [WIS. STAT. § 121.76 (1961)], the term ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ includes only the immediate 
parties to the sale.” (footnote omitted)). 
88. Id. at 453; see also Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 147, 215 N.W. 905, 907 (1927). 
89. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). 
90. Ciociola v. Del. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252, 257 (Del. 1961). 
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not lightly change the legislative scheme.91  Finally, it would be more 
appropriate for vertical privity’s demise to be effectuated by legislative action 
because of its long existence as a part of the state’s jurisprudence.92 
Lifting the vertical privity requirement would conflict with the scheme of 
the Uniform Commercial Code.  The UCC permits the seller of a product to 
disclaim warranties,93 limit remedies,94 and require various notices that must be 
given by a complaining buyer to the seller.95  A manufacturer of a product may 
have great difficulty disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies when the 
manufacturer has no contractual relationship with the ultimate buyer.96  
Similarly, in the absence of a contractual relationship, is it realistic to expect 
that a buyer would notify a remote manufacturer of a defect in its product as 
required by the UCC?97  A buyer’s failure to provide the requisite notice of 
defect to the manufacturer is an absolute bar to the buyer’s claim of breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability.98 
A breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is a claim based on 
contract law, and therefore, the claim should be based on an actual contract.  
Economic loss damages stemming from an inferior product are better left to a 
claim between the buyer and the seller, since they negotiated the terms of the 
contract between them.99  Since a contract claim normally only arises from an 
agreement between the two parties, vertical privity should be required for a 
claim based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.100  All 
warranty claims are an element of contract law, and, therefore, privity should 
be required.101 
Retaining the vertical privity requirement encourages a buyer to pick his 
seller with care.  A buyer who carefully selects his seller will have adequate 
 
91. Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Iowa 1995). 
92. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harris, 190 So. 2d 286, 290 (Ala. 1966). 
93. WIS. STAT. § 402.316 (2015–2016). 
94. Id. § 402.719. 
95. Id. § 402.607(3)(a). 
96. Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898 (Kan. 1984); Tomka v. 
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Iowa 1995). 
97. Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc., 675 P.2d at 898. 
98. WIS. STAT. § 402.607(3)(a). 
99. Steckmar Nat’l Realty & Inv. Corp. v. J I Case Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1979). 
100. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306, 312 (Idaho 
1975). 
101. Wyatt v. N.C. Equip. Co., 117 S.E.2d 21, 24 (N.C. 1960). 
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remedies at law should a warranty be breached.102  Allowing a buyer whose 
seller proves to be irresponsible to sue the manufacturer ignores “the 
consensual elements of commerce.”103   
Finally, none of the three alternatives available for adoption by the states 
under section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Third Party 
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied) eliminates the requirement of 
vertical privity.104  Nothing in Georgia’s version of the UCC section 2-318, 
“which extends the sellers’ warranties to family members and guests in the 
buyer’s home . . . eliminates the requirement that the buyer and the [seller] be 
in privity.”105  Similarly, Maryland’s version of section 2-318 lifts the 
requirement of privity only when personal injury is involved; thus, the 
requirement is still in place for economic loss actions.106 
E. Arguments in Favor of Eliminating the Vertical Privity Requirement 
The reasons why a majority of states do not require vertical privity between 
the remote manufacturer and the buyer in order to validly assert an action based 
on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability can also be catalogued.   
The vertical privity requirement has so many exceptions that its application 
creates unfair results.  Some of the major exceptions to the vertical privity 
requirement created by the courts are products liability, express warranties, 
third-party beneficiaries, and the use of agency/conduit concepts.107  In all of 
the foregoing circumstances, the courts have found persuasive reasons to 
circumvent the privity requirement in contract actions.108  In fact, the privity 
requirement has been so weakened by the various exceptions that it is producing 
unfair results.109  The general rule that privity is required with its “quilt of 
exceptions” creates legal confusion for courts and for plaintiffs who don’t know 
what cause of action is available to them.110   
 
102. Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 389 (Ariz. 1981) (quoting State ex rel. W. 
Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217–18 (Or. 1968)). 
103. Campbell, 442 P.2d at 217. 
104. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 1999). 
105. Thomaston v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
106. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 638 (Md. 1995). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 52–74. 
108. See id. 
109. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873, 881 (Mich. 
1958) (quoting Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946)).  
110. Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (Pa. 1968), overruled on other grounds by 
AM/PM Franchise Ass’n v. Atl. Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990). 
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The requirement of vertical privity leads to numerous, expensive, and 
wasteful lawsuits in which each buyer has to sue only the party to which it has 
privity.  Privity requirements lead to expensive and wasteful procedures 
whereby the buyer sues the retailer, who sues the distributor, who then sues the 
manufacturer.111  The requirement of vertical privity “perpetuat[es] a needless 
chain of actions whereby each buyer must seek redress for breach of warranty 
from his own immediate seller until the actual manufacturer is eventually” held 
responsible.112  Eliminating the vertical privity requirement promotes judicial 
efficiency.113 
In many circumstances, the requirement of vertical privity leaves the 
aggrieved buyer without a remedy.  The rule requiring vertical privity was 
created at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in order to protect 
struggling and unstable manufacturers.114  Today, the concern has shifted from 
protecting the manufacturers to protecting the ultimate buyer.115  Various events 
can intervene to stifle a buyer’s claim against the remote manufacturer.  For 
example, the remote manufacturer can be insulated by the insolvency of the 
dealer, lack of jurisdiction over the manufacturer, disclaimers by the dealer in 
the sales contract with the buyer, or statute of limitation issues.116  It has also 
been argued that retaining the vertical privity requirement could encourage 
manufacturers to use thinly capitalized corporations to sell commercially 
inferior products, and again leave the buyer without an effective remedy.117 
The legislature’s adoption of the UCC section 2-318 abrogated the vertical 
privity requirement.  Many courts have concluded that its state’s adoption of 
section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code eliminated the requirement of 
vertical privity in commercial transactions.118  They reason that the plain 
 
111. Bernick v. Jurden, 293 S.E.2d 405, 414 (N.C. 1982) (quoting Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C., 
Inc., 259 S.E.2d 552, 557 (N.C. 1979)).  
112. Kassab, 246 A.2d at 856. 
113. Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 851–52 (Okla. 
1979). 
114. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967). 
115. Id. 
116. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. 1977) (quoting Prosser, 
supra note 51, at 1124). 
117. Id. at 81–82. 
118. Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. 1995); Dalton v. 
Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 629 A.2d 794, 797 (N.H. 1993); Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. 
Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 17–18 (Utah 1990); Hargett v. Midas Int’l Corp., 508 So. 2d 663, 
665 (Miss. 1987); Cundy v. Int’l Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W.2d 233, 240 (S.D. 1984); Gasque v. 
Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 S.E.2d 384, 390 (Va. 1984); Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 A.2d 
478, 482 (Me. 1983); W. Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 809 (Wyo. 1980). 
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language of the section lifts the privity requirement “as to any natural person 
who may be expected to use, consume or be affected by the product,” which 
those courts believe includes the ultimate buyer of the manufactured product.119  
Since section 2-318 extends liability to third-party beneficiaries, those courts 
reason that this extension includes the ultimate buyer regardless of privity.120 
The same policy reason that caused courts to ignore the vertical privity 
requirement for express warranties applies equally to the implied warranty of 
merchantability.  In Wisconsin,121 as in most other states,122 when a 
manufacturer provides an express warranty to a remote buyer, that express 
warranty creates a “contractual relationship” between the parties.123  The reason 
for creating that “contractual relationship,” and ignoring the requirement of 
vertical privity, is that it would be unjust for a manufacturer to create a demand 
for its product by making representations, but yet not be ultimately responsible 
when the product fails to live up to its representations.124  There seems little 
question that in the era of mass marketing the remote buyer is cultivated by the 
manufacturer.125  The implied warranty of merchantability, which requires that 
a product be fit for its ordinary purpose,126 is the most basic warranty provided 
by the UCC.127  In fact, its importance is recognized by the fact that the UCC 
implies the implied warranty of merchantability into every transaction when a 
merchant sells its product.128  It is unjust to permit a manufacturer to create a 
demand for its product by representing that it is selling a merchantable product, 
but then, because there is no privity of contract between the buyer and the 
remote manufacturer, the buyer is denied the right to recover damages from the 
manufacturer when the product proves itself un-merchantable.129  Certainly, if 
 
119. Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 243 S.E.2d 831, 832 (S.C. 1978); see also W. Equip. Co., 605 
P.2d at 809–10. 
120. Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 743 (Haw. 1983). 
121. Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 518–19, 319 N.W.2d 855, 859 (1982). 
122. See A. E. Korpela, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential in Action Against Remote 
Manufacturer or Distributor for Defects in Goods Not Causing Injury to Person or to Other Property, 
16 A.L.R.3d 683, § 5 (1967). 
123. McNeal v. Blue Bird Corp., No. 308763, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 1082, at *12 (June 12, 
2014) (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty’s, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)). 
124. See Paulson, 107 Wis. 2d at 518. 
125. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80–81 (N.J. 1960). 
126. WIS. STAT. § 402.314(2)(c) (2015–2016). 
127. See id. § 402.314(2). 
128. Id. § 402.314(1). 
129. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 81 (quoting Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 
1932)). 
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an express warranty can be the basis for creating a contractual relationship, the 
implied warranty of merchantability should be accorded the same treatment.130 
The same policy reasons that caused courts to ignore the vertical privity 
requirement when they adopted strict liability applies equally to the implied 
warranty of merchantability.  The doctrine of strict liability in tort evolved from 
contract warranty theories.131  The evolution of strict liability in tort is 
understood as a way of extending express and implied warranties to protect the 
remote purchaser.132  Some of the reasons why strict liability was imposed upon 
manufacturers of products includes the fact that the manufacturer created the 
risk by putting its product in commerce; the manufacturer can control its risk 
by manufacturing safer products; and the manufacturer can more equitably 
distribute the damages its defective products caused through price 
adjustments.133  Those same principles apply to the implied warranty of 
merchantability.134  The manufacturer should not be permitted to place a 
product in commerce that is not fit for its ordinary purpose.  The manufacturer 
has complete control over the product it places in commerce, and lifting the 
privity requirement encourages the manufacturer to build quality into its 
products.135  Also, some courts believe that “[e]conomic loss can certainly be 
as disastrous as physical injury.”136  Finally, the manufacturer is in the best 
position to equitably distribute the economic loss caused by its defective 
product through price adjustments.137  The risk of the lemon is passed along to 
all buyers, as opposed to the individual, unlucky buyer.138   
In the modern marketplace, the retail seller is simply the economic conduit 
for the manufacturer’s product, and as such, the implied warranty of 
merchantability should pass through to the remote buyer.  Most products sold 
in the marketplace are sold through a conduit such as a wholesaler or retailer, 
 
130. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (La. 
1972). 
131. See Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 933, 471 N.W.2d 179, 184–85 
(1991). 
132. Id. at 933–34 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS §§ 95, 95A (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
133. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 451, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967). 
134. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho 1984) (quoting Morrow v. New 
Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 289 (Alaska 1976)).  
135. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 959 (Ind. 2005). 
136. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977). 
137. Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 550, 453 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1990) (quoting Dippel, 37 
Wis. 2d at 450–51). 
138. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 822 N.E.2d at 959. 
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and not directly from the manufacturer.139  The reason for this is simple.  It’s 
cheaper for the manufacturer to sell its products through a conduit rather than 
incurring the costs of direct sales themselves.140  In light of the fact that 
manufacturers currently do, and likely will continue to, sell their products 
through conduits, the law should reflect the commercial realities of those 
transactions.  The intermediaries between the ultimate buyer and the remote 
manufacturer are simply the economic conduits of the manufacturer.141 
Finally, the manufacturer can control its exposure to economic loss 
damages as a result of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability 
through the effective use of disclaimers and limitation of remedies.  First of all, 
the measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability 
“is the difference . . . between the value of the goods [as] accepted and the 
value” of the goods as warranted.142  Also, consequential damages include those 
losses that the seller “at the time of contracting had reason to know and [that] 
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”143  In other words, 
the potential contract damages are not open ended as is often the case with tort 
damages.  Further, the manufacturer can manage these contract damages by 
limiting the remedy for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.144  
Or, the manufacturer can simply eliminate any contract damages by disclaiming 
the implied warranty of merchantability.145  Unquestionably, a manufacturer 
can protect itself from unpredictable and excessive damage claims by limiting 
remedies and issuing disclaimers.146 
F. Analysis 
The requirement of vertical privity provides that in order for a buyer to sue 
a remote manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, 
they must be parties to the same contract.147  That rarely happens, and frankly 
 
139. Lars Perner, Distribution: Wholesaling and Retailing of Food Products, 
http://www.consumerpsychologist.com/food_Distribution.html [https://perma.cc/H85E-QZ3M] (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2017). 
140. Id. 
141. State v. Mitchell Const. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho 1984); see also Morrow v. Caloric 
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 53 (Mo. 1963). 
142. WIS. STAT. § 402.714(2) (2015–2016). 
143. Id. § 402.715(2)(a). 
144. Id. § 402.719(1)(a). 
145. Id. § 402.316(2). 
146. Peterson v. N. Am. Plant Breeders, 354 N.W.2d 625, 632 (Neb. 1984). 
147. Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 145, 215 N.W. 905, 906 (1927) (citing Peterson v. Gales, 
191 Wis. 137, 142–43, 210 N.W. 407, 409 (1926)). 
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should no longer be required.  The requirement of vertical privity was created 
when manufacturing was in its infant stage.148  Its creation was designed to 
protect manufacturers from costly litigation until they had a sufficient 
opportunity to establish themselves financially.149  That time period has long 
passed.  In today’s society, manufacturers are clearly financially able to defend 
themselves against litigation.  Therefore, the current focus should shift from 
protecting the manufacturer to protecting the buyer. 
The implied warranty of merchantability requires that any product sold by 
a manufacturer must be fit for its ordinary purpose.150  Common sense suggests 
that every product made by a manufacturer should meet that minimum standard.  
No product should be sold in the marketplace that is not fit for its ordinary 
purpose.  The importance of this common-sense standard is underscored by the 
fact that it is mandated by law and imposed on every manufacturer.151  The 
implied warranty of merchantability is a statutory warranty.152  Its importance 
is further underscored by the fact that it can only be disclaimed by using the 
word “merchantability” and the disclaimer must be conspicuous.153  Given the 
obvious importance and significance of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, it does not seem just to permit a manufacturer to hide behind 
various defenses when its product proves un-merchantable.  For example, a 
buyer can be denied remedy against the manufacturer because of the dealer’s 
insolvency, lack of jurisdiction over the manufacturer, dealer disclaimers in the 
contract of sale, or statute of limitation issues.154  If the implied warranty of 
merchantability is as important as the UCC suggests, these defenses should not 
be available.  They simply perpetuate an injustice. 
Further, manufacturers do not need the various defenses noted above.  
Manufacturers have ample opportunity to protect themselves when their 
product is sold.  The UCC permits manufacturers to disclaim the implied 
warranty of merchantability155 and also to limit the remedy of an unsatisfied 
buyer.156  Is it not more honest to require a manufacturer to conspicuously 
 
148. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967). 
149. Id. 
150. WIS. STAT. § 402.314(2)(c). 
151. Id. § 402.314(1). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. § 402.316(2). 
154. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. 1977) (quoting Prosser, 
supra note 51, at 1124). 
155. WIS. STAT. § 402.316(2). 
156. Id. § 402.719. 
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disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability in the contract of sale, rather 
than permit the manufacturer to hide behind the various defenses noted above? 
Also, it’s a simple task for manufacturers to disclaim the implied warranty 
of merchantability and limit a buyer’s remedies.  Virtually every product sold 
by a manufacturer contains some type of an express warranty.157  As such, the 
manufacturer can simply place any disclaimers and limitation of remedies in 
with its express warranty.  The courts have already approved such an 
approach.158  Actual knowledge is not required by the buyer or dealer, but 
simply that the disclaimer and limitation of remedy be “reasonably noticeable” 
when the sale occurs.159 
As noted, manufacturers simply need to make sure that their disclaimer or 
limitation of remedy is reasonably noticeable to the buyer.160  One of the 
primary ways to make the manufacturer’s disclaimer or limitation of remedy 
reasonably noticeable is to place that burden on the manufacturer’s dealer or 
retailer.  One of the primary arguments espoused by the courts in support of 
keeping the vertical privity requirement is that the requirement of vertical 
privity encourages a buyer to be more careful when selecting its seller.161  In 
fact, the converse should be true.  The manufacturer should be more careful 
when it chooses its seller to be sure that its seller will make the manufacturer’s 
disclaimer or limitation of remedy reasonably noticeable. 
Removing the vertical privity requirement as an impediment to a suit 
against a remote manufacturer is an outgrowth of the economic loss doctrine.  
The economic loss doctrine provides that a claim solely for economic loss can 
only be brought as a contract action.162  A breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability is clearly a claim for economic loss and, therefore, must be 
brought as a contract action.163  Since the buyer is forced by law to pursue only 
a contract action, the law should provide every opportunity for the aggrieved 
buyer to secure a full recovery in that contract action.  Thus, extending the 
 
157. V. Padmanabhan, Marketing and Warranty, in PRODUCT WARRANTY HANDBOOK 393, 402 
(Wallace R. Blischke & D.N. Prabhakar Murthy eds., 1996) (citing E. PATRICK 
MCGUIRE, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT WARRANTIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 1 (1980)) (“Although 
virtually all producers of industrial goods offer some sort of warranty, there is substantial variation in 
the kind of protection provided, the length of the warranties, and in the method of administration.”). 
158. E.g., R & L Grain Co. v. Chi. E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 207 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
159. Id. at 208–09. 
160. See id. at 209. 
161. Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 388–89 (Ariz. 1981) (quoting State ex rel. 
W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217–18 (Or. 1968)). 
162. Ralph C. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss Doctrine, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
1121, 1121 (2010). 
163. Anzivino, supra note 18, at 1083. 
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implied warranty of merchantability to the remote manufacturer is entirely 
consistent with and a fair outgrowth of the economic loss doctrine. 
Interestingly, both the majority and minority of state courts cite the 
legislature’s adoption of the UCC section 2-318 (Third Party Beneficiaries of 
Warranties Express or Implied) as support for their particular rule when it 
comes to extending the implied warranty to the remote manufacturer.164  Of 
course, the legislature’s adoption of section 2-318 can’t support both positions.  
It’s more likely the adoption doesn’t support either position, which is exactly 
what the official comments to the UCC state.165  Wisconsin has adopted 
alternative A to section 2-318.166  It is the narrowest of the three alternatives 
available under the UCC.167  The argument that the adoption of section 2-318 
precludes any further extension of warranties was made and rejected by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.168  In Dippel v. Sciano, it was “argue[d] that the 
legislature by enacting sec. 402.318, . . . acted in the field and [therefore,] has 
specifically limited the seller’s liability for breach of implied warranty to the 
buyer’s family and guests.”169  The court responded by quoting the UCC section 
2-318, comment 3, which provides that “the section is neutral and is not 
intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s 
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the 
distributive chain.”170  Based on the comment, the court rejected the preclusion 
argument.171  In other words, the adoption of Wisconsin Statutes section 
402.318 and its language is not a bar to the extension of the implied warranty 
of merchantability to a remote manufacturer. 
Finally, it should be noted that extending the implied warranty of 
merchantability to the remote manufacturer does not necessarily mean that the 
aggrieved buyer will win its case.  Rather, the buyer must still carry its burden 
of proof, and if it fails to do so, the buyer will lose.172 
 
164. See Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 437 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Ark. 1969) 
(demonstrating the majority opinion); see also Tex Enters., Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 66 P.3d 
625, 628 (Wash. 2003) (demonstrating the minority opinion). 
165. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). 
166. Compare WIS. STAT. § 402.318 (2015–2016), with U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). 
167. WIS. STAT. § 402.318. 
168. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 458, 155 N.W.2d 55, 62 (1967) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318 
cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962)). 
169. Id. at 458 (citing U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962)). 
170. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962)). 
171. Id. 
172. See, e.g., Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The requirement that an aggrieved buyer may not sue a remote 
manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability was created 
at a time when it was thought necessary to protect the fragile manufacturing 
industry in this country.  Those days have long passed.  Nowadays, 
manufacturers are well able to defend themselves, both financially and through 
disclaimers or limitation of remedies, when their products are sold.  At this 
point in time, the focus should shift from protecting the manufacturers to 
protecting the aggrieved buyer. 
The implied warranty of merchantability is the most basic warranty that 
every manufactured product must meet.  It is simply common sense that no 
manufacturer should make and sell a product that is not fit for its ordinary 
purpose.  This obligation is so essential that the Uniform Commercial Code 
mandates it by requiring every manufacturer to give the warranty as a matter of 
law.  To be fair, however, the Uniform Commercial Code does permit a 
manufacturer to limit its exposure by allowing the manufacturer to disclaim the 
implied warranty or limit the buyer’s remedy.  The balance provided by the 
UCC seems to be the correct one in that every buyer receives the implied 
warranty unless the manufacturer has reasonably disclaimed it.  That seems a 
fair bargain to both sides.  Inserting the requirement of vertical privity into the 
balance unfortunately has created technical defenses that has left buyers 
without a remedy.  The net effect of these defenses is that the manufacturer can 
avoid its responsibility without having to disclaim the implied warranty of 
merchantability.  On balance, the requirement of vertical privity is unnecessary, 
unfair to any buyer, and should not be tolerated by the law. 
 
